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Abstract—Enclaves have emerged as a particularly compelling
primitive to implement trusted execution environments: strongly
isolated sensitive user-mode processes in a largely untrusted
software environment. While the threat models employed by
various enclave systems differ, the high-level guarantees they offer
are essentially the same: attestation of an enclave’s initial state,
as well as a guarantee of enclave integrity and privacy in the
presence of an adversary.
This work describes Sanctorum, a small trusted code base
(TCB), consisting of a generic enclave-capable system, which
is sufficient to implement secure enclaves akin to the primitive
offered by Intel’s SGX. While enclaves may be implemented via
unconditionally trusted hardware and microcode, as it is the
case in SGX, we employ a smaller TCB principally consisting
of authenticated, privileged software, which may be replaced or
patched as needed. Sanctorum implements a formally verified
specification for generic enclaves on an in-order multiproces-
sor system meeting baseline security requirements, e.g., the
MIT Sanctum processor and the Keystone enclave framework.
Sanctorum requires trustworthy hardware including a random
number generator, a private cryptographic key pair derived via
a secure bootstrapping protocol, and a robust isolation primitive
to safeguard sensitive information. Sanctorum’s threat model is
informed by the threat model of the isolation primitive, and is
suitable for adding enclaves to a variety of processor systems.
Index Terms—trusted execution, enclave, secure processor
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to ensure security for outsourced computations, it is
necessary to first consider meaningful security guarantees that
are realistically enforceable on a remote platform and how to
verify that these guarantees have been upheld. Trusted Execu-
tion Environments (TEEs) seek to satisfy these requirements.
One of the approaches to TEEs consists of providing strong
isolation for user mode processes called enclaves. Enclaves
are designed to preserve their confidentiality and integrity in
the presence of a malicious operating system (OS) or other
enclaves. However, defining what it means for an enclave to
be truly isolated is not easy when faced with side channel
adversaries exploiting leakage from data dependent utilization
of shared resources such as caches, OS managed demand
paging, or, more recently, speculative execution.
Hardware support for enforcing low level invariants has
been used to provide high level isolation guarantees for
systems such as Aegis [12], SGX [8], Bastion [2], Sanctum
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[3], and Komodo [4]. Sanctorum, the trusted software enabling
the Sanctum processor, focuses on utilizing a small, privileged
piece of monitor code in conjunction with partitioned caches
and flushing of shared state on context switches to provide
isolation for enclaved processes across either space or time.
This allows enclaves to share hardware resources for perfor-
mance improvements, but ensures that enclave state cannot be
impacted by external code in a data dependent manner either
directly or indirectly. This paradigm also allows hardware to
evolve separately from the software – the same hardware can
be used with a more powerful security monitor to protect
against new attacks, or the security monitor can be used with
a different hardware design as long as it supports a minimal
set of isolation mechanisms.
II. RELATED WORK
Many different approaches for providing trusted execution
environments within semi-trusted systems have been proposed
[1], [2], [4], [12]. Differences are primarily found in which
components are trusted and whether any measurement or
formal verification of these components is provided, whether
isolation is provided by hardware or software, and the different
adversarial models that are considered.
a) Hardware Support: Aegis [12], Bastion [2], SGX [8],
Sanctum [3] and Komodo [4] all utilize hardware support to
provide isolation for trusted execution environments. Sancto-
rum is the security monitor for the Sanctum processor.
Komodo and Sanctorum both require isolated memory
regions, a protected execution environment for the monitor
code, a root of trust for attestations, and a secure source
of randomness. Bastion requires more significant changes,
including new registers, protected disk regions, and cache
modifications, to support its isolation guarantees [2]. SeL4 [6]
and the work of Andronick et al. [1], which is based on seL4,
do not require specialized hardware and instead rely on the
kernel to enforce isolation.
b) Formal Verification and Trusted Code Base: Komodo
[4], seL4 [6], and Andronick et al. [1] all provide formal veri-
fication for their isolation models. SGX is neither verified nor
easy to inspect as it is primarily implemented as undocumented
processor microcode. SeL4 [6] does not provide enclave-like
guarantees in terms of isolation, but it does demonstrate an
example of large, formally verified software implemented with
security as a primary goal. While Sanctorum itself is not
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formally verified, its design is based on a formally verified
specification for enclaves as described in [11].
c) Side Channel and Hardware Adversaries: Komodo
[4] supports protection against physical attacks on memory
while Bastion [4] provides defense against physical attacks on
memory, busses, and disks. Neither defends against memory
access pattern attacks; provable defense against these types of
attacks requires Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM)
as in the Ascend processor [9]. Neither Komodo nor Bastion
provide any defense against side channel adversaries conduct-
ing attacks on shared caches, TLB, etc. SGX and Bastion
are also vulnerable to controlled channel attacks in which a
malicious OS abuses its control over paging to learn enclave
access patterns. Neither seL4 [6] nor Andronick et al. [1]
explicitly consider side channel adversaries, but Andronick et
al. mention flushing shared resources before context switches
as necessary to enforce isolation.
Sanctum [3] and the current implementation of Sanctorum
defend against a large class of side channel attacks but do not
consider hardware adversaries. Hardening against an adversary
capable of tampering with memory requires the use of the
memory controller of the Ascend processor [9] in Sanctum.
III. THE ENCLAVE EXECUTION MODEL
An enclave is an isolated process consisting of one or more
threads and a exclusive allocation of the machine resources
needed by the process: memory (physical pages) and hardware
structures (cache lines, etc.). Enclaves guarantee integrity
and confidentiality for private computations and data in the
presence of untrusted privileged software such as an OS or
hypervisor [11]. Therefore, enclaves cannot rely on the OS to
transparently provide services without potentially violating the
integrity and confidentiality of the enclave’s data.
Since an enclave uses isolated resources, neither the direct
nor the indirect side effects of an enclave’s work are visible
to untrusted software, including privileged system software.
However, an enclave is not prevented from deliberately leaking
its own secrets, as it is able to access resources shared with it
by the OS (in order to receive inputs, interact with I/O, etc),
leaking the timing of these accesses. Although the OS cannot
modify any enclave state, it can perform denial of service
or wholesale destruction of the enclave, as it orchestrates
machine resources. This, however, does not result in any loss
of integrity or confidentiality for the enclave.
In addition to guaranteeing isolated execution and private
state, Sanctorum (“the security monitor”, or SM) authenticates
enclaves via a cryptographic measurement of their initial state.
These properties allow an enclaved application to implement
complex behavior with higher-level security properties.
IV. THREAT MODEL
The enclave primitive provides a foundation upon which a
secure system can be built. A prudent software system designer
can leverage these isolation containers to construct systems
with a small, trustworthy trusted computing base.
SM assumes an insidious privileged software adversary
able to subvert any software (other than SM) in order to
impersonate, tamper with, or inspect an enclave. Denial of
service is impossible to defend against in this setting, and
is therefore not considered (SM does ensure an OS is able to
stop a runaway enclave). The specific abilities of the modelled
adversary to inspect enclaves via indirect means, such as cache
tag state or availability of other shared resources, depends
on the availability of isolated protection domains for these
surfaces in the hardware platform.
A. Trust assumed by SM
A given enclave binary is assumed trustworthy, but is
authenticated via a measurement of its initial state taken by
SM. SM’s binary image is also assumed to be trustworthy (but
is authenticated via a secure boot protocol and endowed with
unique keys [7]), and is covered by the attestation. The hard-
ware platform is unconditionally trusted, as hardware defies
cryptographic measurement, and should be authenticated as
part of remote attestation. Trust in the authenticated binaries
can be garnered through formal verification, rigorous testing,
etc. A trusted first party is required to verify remote attestations
(cf. Section VI-C) on enclave state. This process requires a
PKI to bootstrap trust in the hardware and SM.
Enclaves are trusted to neither compromise their own in-
tegrity nor transmit private state to a potential adversary, e.g.,
by copying it to shared memory. An enclave’s interactions
with other software, including SM, may transmit information;
the enclave is trusted not to perform these communications in
ways dependent on private information. Any such communica-
tion leaks at a minimum the timing of this communication, and
may further leak information about microarchitectural state
influenced by an enclave’s private execution. The text of the
enclave binary is trusted to use communication judiciously,
and block or tolerate any leakage permitted by the hardware
platform that is within the threat model. The hardware platform
is trusted to respect the text of the enclave and not sponta-
neously (e.g., speculatively) perform operations that transmit
information across protection domains.
SM maps the high-level semantics of enclaves to low-
level machine configuration to enforce isolation of machine
resources along protection domain boundaries. To accomplish
this, SM checks and maintains that the untrusted system
software’s allocation of machine resources to enclaves respects
protection domain boundaries and is exclusive. SM relies on
the underlying hardware platform to implement meaningful
isolation of the resources across protection domains. Side
channel leakage, in particular, requires strong isolation by the
hardware platform either by flushing state between context
switches or by ensuring that the resource is not shared by
different protection domains. SM requires the underlying hard-
ware to guarantee several properties outlined below.
B. Hardware Platform Requirements
In order to achieve secure enclaves, Sanctorum requires sev-
eral high-level properties of the underlying hardware platform:
1) Memory isolation across protection domains: The hard-
ware must guarantee isolation of “protection domains” in order
to allow SM to isolate itself from any other piece of software
and enclaves from each other and from the untrusted OS in
memory. The hardware platform must also be able to restrict
access by external actors: SM must be able to restrict DMA
by devices to memory owned by SM or enclaves.
2) Isolated computation across protection domains: The
hardware platform must guarantee isolation for all the shared
resources considered by the threat model. These resources
are partitioned across protection domains (if the hardware
can support this) with non-interference across partitions, or
time-multiplexed across protection domains and cleaned by
SM at each re-allocation. For example, the MIT Sanctum
processor time-multiplexes cores (including register files and
all microarchitectural state and L1 caches), partitions the
shared L2 cache (via page coloring), and excludes the shared
coherence and DRAM bandwidth from consideration in the
threat model. Other platforms may choose to protect other
surfaces, which will affect the platform’s threat model.
3) Exclusive elevated privilege for SM: In order to prevent
efforts by the OS or other software to supplant SM execution
and violate security invariants, SM must execute at a higher
privilege level than any untrusted software, and have exclusive
unrestricted access to physical memory. The hardware must
support such privilege. The SM must also be able to interpose
on hardware events such as faults and interrupts, as these
events may cause a change in the protection domain on whose
behalf a core executes, and require machine resources be
cleaned and re-allocated. For example, the OS must not be able
to execute its fault handler on a core with enclave permissions
by sending a software interrupt; SM must be able to receive
the interrupt, perform an enclave exit on the core, and then
delegate the interrupt to the OS.
4) Cryptography for attestation: Enclaves must have pri-
vate access to a trusted source of entropy to perform key agree-
ment and seed cryptographic keys. The hardware platform
must enable a trusted public key infrastructure (PKI) for SM
(a secret attestation key backed by certificates conveying trust
in this SM on this hardware platform) which enables remote
parties to authenticate the hardware and the measurement root.
V. SECURITY MONITOR
Sanctorum (SM) implements a small, trusted, privileged
security monitor in order to enforce a security policy over the
untrusted system software’s handling of machine resources.
SM translates the high-level semantics of isolated enclaves into
the low-level isolation invariants of machine resources along
protection domain boundaries, as implemented by trusted
hardware (cf. Section IV-B1). SM is not a kernel, as it does not
make resource management decisions, instead only verifying
the decisions made by system software.
A. Security Monitor Interface
SM implements an API for enclaves and untrusted system
software to indirectly manage system resources, as permitted
by SM’s security state machine. SM also interposes on ma-
chine events such as page faults and interrupts in order to
ensure that these events do not violate the system’s security
policy. SM’s API calls are also implemented via machine
events as a system call to SM. As shown in Figure 1, the
interface forwards OS events to the OS handler, but requires
an Asynchronous Enclave Exit, or AEX (cf. Section V-C) to
clean sensitive processor state before delegating the event to
the OS. Enclaves can implement fault handlers, and receive
some traps/faults in order to implement paging or handle some
exceptions. The OS is always able to de-schedule an enclave
by interrupting it, forcing an AEX.
Fig. 1. SM API via system exceptions, much like a system call.
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The SM API is highly concurrent on a multicore processor,
and requires transaction semantics for most API calls. After
authorizing the caller, SM uses fine-grained locks, and fails
transactions in case of a concurrent operation. SM checks
the API call against the machine’s current security policy to
ensure SM cannot be asked to violate an enclave, nor allow a
malicious enclave to compromise the untrusted system.
B. Machine Resources managed by SM
SM enforces invariants over the system software’s allocation
of isolated resources (cores, physical memory, cache lines,
etc.) to their respective protection domains (SM itself, un-
trusted software, and each enclave). Protection domains must
be non-overlapping with respect to machine resources in order
to guarantee isolation: sharing of resources leaks their avail-
ability, and allows indirect observation of private information
(as generously exemplified by the recent proliferation of cache
timing attacks). Furthermore, protection domains must not be
allowed to modify resource allocations of other protection
domains: a malicious OS would remove a portion of enclave’s
memory, and learn private information if the enclave generates
a fault.
Fig. 2. Generic resource state transitions enforced by SM.
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This does not mean enclaves are static. Instead, an
enclave may collaborate with the OS to implement
dynamic behaviors like re-allocation of resources or
time-multiplexing of existing resources (e.g., demand
paging). As shown in Figure 2, a protection domain
can block (block_resource(type, rid)) a
resource it owns, which the OS will be able to
reclaim or re-allocate to a new owner by cleaning it
(clean_resource(type, rid)). An existing domain
can accept (accept_resource(type, rid)) resources
the OS offers, completing the transition of the resource to a
new protection domain.
SM maintains a map of each resource to its respective
owner and a lock via resource metadata. Metadata arrays
for statically partitioned resources (e.g., cores, static memory
and cache partitions) are pre-allocated as part of SM’s binary
image. The management of dynamic resources (e.g., enclaves,
threads, and intervals of physical memory, if applicable) is
implementation-specific (cf. Section VII); the metadata must
wholly reside in SM-owned memory, and be non-overlapping
with other structures. The management of all mutable re-
sources takes place indirectly via calls to SM’s narrow API by
the resource owner or the untrusted system software, within
SM’s security invariants. SM also maintains some global static
state, such as the expected measurement (cf. Section VI-A) of
the signing enclave (cf. Section VI-C), and SM’s certificates
and keys.
C. Enclaves and Enclave Threads managed by SM
SM implements enclaves: strongly isolated processes with
guarantees of exclusive access to a set of machine resources.
At a minimum enclaves use private physical memory con-
taining enclave private virtual pages and page tables, with
additional isolation (cache lines, etc.) if implemented by the
hardware platform.
Enclave metadata tracks various properties (the enclave’s
measurement, virtual range, lifecycle state, lock), thread IDs
(tid), and the machine resources owned by this enclave. The
metadata also contains mailboxes (cf. Section VI-B) used for
trusted inter-enclave communication. While SM authenticates
enclaves via their measurement (cf. Section VI-A), enclave IDs
(eid) are used to refer to the enclave data structure throughout
the SM API. An eid is the physical address of the enclave’s
metadata structure. SM and untrusted software are identified
via reserved constants.
Enclaves use private page tables for accesses within the
enclave virtual range (evrange), and manage their own
private memory, as needed. Accesses to memory shared with
the operating system (outside evrange) are implementation-
dependent, and may leak timing information.
Fig. 3. Enclave state transitions enforced by SM.
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The lifecycle of an enclave is illustrated in Figure 3:
untrusted system software creates an enclave, via
create_enclave(eid, evrange, resources...),
in a free segment of SM-owned memory (SM enforces safety).
After the enclave metadata is created, the OS can grant
memory and other resources to the newly created eid. Further,
SM can initialize the enclave’s physical and virtual memory
by reserving space for enclave-private page tables, copy pages
from untrusted memory to the enclave’s virtual memory,
and create threads (allocate_page_table(...),
load_page(...), create_thread(...), respectively
(not detailed here for brevity). A init_enclave(eid)
API call “seals” the enclave, preventing further modifications
by untrusted software via the API, finalizing the measurement,
and allowing the enclave’s threads to be scheduled on a core
(as described below). An enclave can block its own resources,
or accept new resources granted by the OS, leaking the
timing of these operations. The untrusted system software can
destroy an enclave in its entirety, blocking all of its owned
resources (delete_enclave(eid)), provided none of its
threads are scheduled. SM will require all of the enclave’s
resources be cleaned (cf. Section V-B) before they can be
re-allocated.
Enclave threads scheduled onto processor cores (via
enter_enclave(eid, tid)) will execute uninterrupted
until either the enclave exits (exit_enclave()), or an
event causes an asynchronous enclave exit (AEX), e.g., as a
result of the OS de-scheduling the enclave. Upon an AEX,
SM saves the state of the enclave thread being suspended
into a reserved AEX state structure in the thread metadata,
and sets a flag indicating that an AEX had occurred. If the
enclave re-enters, it will execute from its entry point, but may
respond to the presence of the AEX state to resume execution,
if implemented by the enclave. Before delegating execution to
the OS, SM cleans the core’s state (this is a re-allocation of
the “core” resource to another protection domain).
Fig. 4. Enclave thread state transitions enforced by SM.
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Thread metadata structures are another first-class type rec-
ognized by SM, their lifecycle illustrated in Figure 4. Like
enclave metadata, the physical address of a thread’s metadata
is a thread ID (tid), and is used to refer to the thread
throughout the API. The thread metadata tracks the thread’s
owner enclave, lock, the core it is scheduled on, the presence
of an AEX state dump, and the address to execute upon
enclave_enter, as well as the addresses of fault handlers.
Thread metadata also reserves space for core state in case of
an AEX and, separately, in case of a fault. After a thread
is created, it is assigned to an enclave. Once the enclave
is destroyed or blocks the thread, it can be cleaned and re-
allocated to another enclave. The enclave can accept the thread
via accept_thread(tid).
VI. ENCLAVE ATTESTATION
Attestation allows enclaves to prove their authenticity to
local or remote parties leveraging trust in SM, the processor,
and the manufacturer’s PKI. SM provides a trusted message-
passing interface for local attestation of enclaves, and trusts a
specific “signing” enclave to produce certificates for remote
attestation with SM’s secret key. A trusted first party is
expected to verify this certificate to ascertain trust in the initial
state of the enclave being attested to.
A. Measurement
SM measures enclaves via a sha3 [10] cryptographic hash
computed for each enclave as part of initialization. This
measurement covers the enclave’s configuration, private virtual
memory, and any global state necessary to convey trust (e.g.,
the identity of SM and capabilities of the hardware). SM
performs all operations affecting the initial state of the enclave,
and thus has sufficient authority to compute the measurement.
Each operation performed by SM on behalf of the OS as part
of enclave initialization (creating the enclave data structure,
reserving space for page tables, loading pages, loading threads)
extends the enclave’s hash with each operation to produce a
final measurement at initialization.
Two equivalent enclaves initialized with identical virtual ad-
dresses will have equal measurements; the physical addresses
used when initializing the enclave are not covered by mea-
surement. In order to ensure that measurement is descriptive
of the enclave’s initial state, the mapping between an enclave’s
virtual page numbers and pages in physical memory must
be injective (no aliasing). To simplify SM’s logic needed to
enforce this invariant, SM requires that enclaves be loaded in
ascending (monotonically increasing) order of physical page
numbers. The enclave’s page tables must be initialized before
any data, and are at the base of its physical address space.
The measurement of an enclave’s initial state authenticates
the enclave, provided the enclave, SM, and hardware platform
maintain the enclave’s integrity after measurement. This au-
thentication is a necessary part of attestation, which conveys
trust in a local or remote enclave to a party (conditional on
trust in the hardware, SM, and enclave measurement).
B. Local Attestation
In the case where both the enclave being attested to and the
verifying enclave execute on the same hardware platform, un-
der the same SM, local attestation is available. SM guarantees
integrity and sender identity for local messages without cryp-
tographic proofs through its authority over all other software:
by implementing a trusted, authenticated message passing API,
local enclaves can prove their identity to other local enclaves
via their mutual trust in SM.
Fig. 5. Mailbox state transitions enforced by SM.
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Specifically, SM endows each enclave metadata struc-
ture in SM memory with a buffer of one or more “mail-
boxes” used by that enclave to receive authenticated mes-
sages. As shown in Figure 5, each mailbox can re-
ceive mail tagged with the measurement of the sender by
SM via SM’s send_mail(recipient_id, message),
get_mail(sender_id, out_msg*, out_sender*)
APIs. In order to thwart denial of service by a malicious
sender, the recipient must signal their intent to receive from a
specific sender via the accept_mail(sender_id) API.
Fig. 6. A local attestation of E1 by E2.
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Consider the example in Figure 6. Here, Enclave E2 attests
enclave E1, and untrusted system software informs the partici-
pating enclaves of the relevant sender IDs. E2 signals its intent
to receive messages from E1 1©, which enables E1 to send a
message to E2 2©. SM stores the message in E2’s mailbox
for communication with E1. SM also records the sender’s
measurement. The recipient, E2, fetches its messages 3©, and
can validate the sender’s hash against an expected constant 4©
in order to authenticate the message.
C. Remote Attestation
Attestation without a trusted communication medium re-
quires cryptography. In order to provide enclave attestations
to a remote verifier, SM relies on a remote attestation protocol
to establish a private channel, present a certificate connecting
the enclave to a root of trust, and sign a nonce provided by the
verifier. Specifically, a key agreement scheme derives a shared
key for encrypted communication without trust in the system
software or network. (If attestation succeeds, the remote party
relies on enclave isolation to safeguard the shared key.) Recall
that SM assumes (cf. Section IV-B3) a trusted signing key and
PKI able to connect trust in SM and its hardware platform.
SM produces an attestation via this signing key by signing
an enclave’s message and measurement, but does not itself
guarantee a confidential execution environment (because SM
itself is a shared resource), relying instead on a trusted “sign-
ing enclave” to compute the signature. The signing enclave’s
measurement is hard-coded in the security monitor, allowing
it to retrieve the key via a accept_mail(get_key) API,
while local attestation (cf. Section VI-B) allows the enclaves
seeking attestation to communicate with the signing enclave.
SM also stores the certificate(s) needed to ascertain its trust-
worthiness via the trusted PKI, and exposes them via a public
API get_field(field_id, out_data*).
Fig. 7. A remote attestation of E1 by a trusted first party
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Consider an attestation of enclave E1 by a trusted remote
first party exemplified in Figure 6. The OS is responsible for
scheduling the signing enclave ES , communicating relevant
enclave IDs, and providing (untrusted) I/O to the trusted first
party. After key agreement 1©, the remote party generates a
nonce 2©, which E1 sends to ES via a mailbox 3©. ES fetches
SM’s key 4© and signs the nonce and E1’s measurement to
produce an attestation 5©. E1 receives its attestation via its
mailbox 6©, and assembles a message to the remote party:
SM’s certificate 7© cryptographically connects the attestation
to the trusted PKI. The remote party must receive 8© and
verify 9© the attestation in order to bootstrap trust in the
encrypted channel created via key agreement. Provided the at-
testation succeeds, the shared key authenticates all subsequent
messages 10© sent by E1.
VII. ARCHITECTURE-SPECIFIC COMPONENTS
SM (cf. Section V) implements a monitor able to support
enclaves on an abstract machine consisting of an array of typed
resources isolated by the hardware platform, including, at a
minimum, cores and physical memory. Refining the high-level
tasks of cleaning resources and assigning them to protection
domains is specific to the hardware platform. Of importance is
SM’s implementation of memory: private segments of physical
memory are used throughout SM, but SM does not prescribe
specific means by which memory is isolated.
A. MIT Sanctum processor
In the MIT Sanctum Processor [3], memory isolation is
provided by allocating memory in the form of 64 isolated
DRAM regions of fixed size (32 MB). SM for Sanctum
straightforwardly stores dynamic arrays in “metadata regions”:
SM-owned regions granted to it by the OS. DRAM regions are
isolated throughout the shared memory hierarchy including the
last-level cache. A page table walk invariant guarantees TLB
entries conform to the allocation DRAM regions, requiring a
TLB shootdown whenever DRAM regions are re-allocated to
a different protection domain.
A small set of hardware modifications over a baseline RISC-
V processor implement physical isolation of SM memory
from all software, a private page walk for addresses within
evrange, and enforce physical memory permissions at the
granularity of DRAM regions. RISC-V’s M-mode straightfor-
wardly grants SM ultimate authority and access in a Sanctum
processor system. A secure boot protocol [7] endows SM
with keys rooted in its measurement and the specific device.
Sanctum’s cores are in-order, single-thread pipelines, and are
exclusively scheduled to protection domains. When cleaned,
the processor flushes its private caches and architected state.
SM is largely implemented in portable, modular C99 code
for simplified verification. The existing implementation for the
MIT Sanctum processor consists of 5785 LOC (C: 5264 LOC,
Assembly: 521 LOC). Much of this code is a cryptographic
hash function, standard C library functions, and privileged
code required to boot a modern OS. Excluding these, the non
platform-specific SM code weighs in at 1011 LOC of C99.
B. Keystone Enclave Framework
Keystone [5] is an enclave framework using RISC-V’s
powerful physical memory protection (PMP) primitive [13],
and does not rely on hardware modifications to standard
RISC-V processors. PMP allows dynamic white-listing of
intervals of memory as being accessible by specific privilege
modes. Keystone contains an independent implementation of
Sanctorum concepts to meet the same objectives using PMP.
For memory isolation, SM straightforwardly marks its own
private state as solely accessible via RISC-V’s M-Mode,
allowing the OS to access physical memory outside of this
forbidden range, and granting itself unrestricted access. En-
claves are likewise marked via a white-listed range of physical
memory of arbitrary size. Enclaves use a private set of page
tables for all memory accesses, and both these tables and the
memory region are protected by PMP. For access to shared
resources outside evrange the enclave has a shared memory
section in its page tables mapped to an OS-allocated untrusted
buffer. Keystone does not, at the time of this writing, isolate
microarchitectural resources such as shared cache lines across
arbitrary platforms, as reflected by its threat model.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Sanctorum (SM) is a minimal security monitor for enclaved
computations running on in-order multiprocessors. It enforces
a set of low level isolation properties to provide confidentiality
and integrity for remote computations. Sanctorum prevents
realistic side channel attacks against shared caches and attacks
on demand paging. Sanctorum is being expanded to include
proposed defenses against recently discovered attacks on spec-
ulative execution such as Spectre.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Andronick, D. Greenaway, and K. Elphinstone. Towards proving
security in the presence of large untrusted components. In Proceedings
of the 5th International Conference on Systems Software Verification,
SSV’10, pages 9–9, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2010.
[2] D. Champagne and R. B. Lee. Scalable architectural support for trusted
software. In HPCA - 16 2010 The Sixteenth International Symposium
on High-Performance Computer Architecture, pages 1–12, Jan 2010.
[3] V. Costan, I. Lebedev, and S. Devadas. Sanctum: Minimal hardware
extensions for strong software isolation. In 25th USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX Security 16), pages 857–874, 2016.
[4] A. Ferraiuolo, A. Baumann, C. Hawblitzel, and B. Parno. Komodo:
Using verification to disentangle secure-enclave hardware from software.
In Proceedings of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles,
SOSP ’17, pages 287–305, 2017.
[5] Keystone. Keystone: Open-source secure hardware enclave. https://
keystone-enclave.org/, 2018.
[6] G. Klein, K. Elphinstone, G. Heiser, J. Andronick, D. Cock, P. Derrin,
D. Elkaduwe, K. Engelhardt, R. Kolanski, M. Norrish, et al. sel4: Formal
verification of an os kernel. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd
symposium on Operating systems principles, pages 207–220, 2009.
[7] I. A. Lebedev, K. Hogan, and S. Devadas. Secure Boot and Remote
Attestation in the Sanctum Processor. In 31st IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium, CSF, pages 46–60, 2018.
[8] F. McKeen, I. Alexandrovich, A. Berenzon, C. V. Rozas, H. Shafi,
V. Shanbhogue, and U. R. Savagaonkar. Innovative instructions and
software model for isolated execution. HASP, 2013.
[9] L. Ren, C. W. Fletcher, A. Kwon, M. van Dijk, and S. Devadas. Design
and implementation of the ascend secure processor. IEEE Transactions
on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2018.
[10] M.-J. O. Saarinen. tiny sha3. https://github.com/mjosaarinen/tiny sha3,
2018.
[11] P. Subramanyan, R. Sinha, I. Lebedev, S. Devadas, and S. A. Seshia.
A formal foundation for secure remote execution of enclaves. In
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 2435–2450. ACM, 2017.
[12] G. E. Suh, D. Clarke, B. Gassend, M. Van Dijk, and S. Devadas.
AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing.
In international conference on Supercomputing (ICS). ACM, 2003.
[13] A. Waterman and K. Asanovic´. The risc-v instruction set man-
ual, volume ii: Privileged architecture. https://riscv.org/specifications/
privileged-isa/, 2017.
